Jamnes Toiin, for example, recently stated that: the mix of policies is unhealthy. To achieve a solid recovery, such as the administration projects, and to achieye it withommt astronomical interest rates and serious crowding out, we need an easier monetary policy comhined with a tighter fiscal policy.'
Economists at the Brookings Institution have expressed a similar view:
Beyond 1982, the key to an improved economic situation must lie in a realigmument of economic policya shift in the mix of fiscal and monetary policy, by matching reductions of future budget deficits with an easier monetary policy. As presently constituted, fiscal and monetary policies appear to he on a collision course 2
The Congressional Budget Office talks of the clash between mnonetary and fiscal policy:
Statements from the Federal Reserve suggest that monetary policy will continue its anti-inflationary 'James Tohin, "The wrong Mix lbr Recovery," Challenge (May-' June 1982), p. 25, tm Joseph A, Pechman and Barry P. I3oswomth, "The Budget and the Economy," in Joseph A. Pechmnan, ed,, Setting Nationa/ Priorities: The 1983 Budget (The Brookings Institution, 1982) , p. 43' stance in the coming years. . By contrast, the budget measures enacted last summer will provide considerable stimulus to economic activity over the next few years. This suggests the possibility of a clash between monetar and fiscal policy unless the Congress emmacts further spending cuts and tax increases to reduce federal borrowing or the Federal Reserve adopts a less restrictive monetary policy. If the clash materializes, it will he reflected in high real interest rates that crowd out private investment.'T he notion of policy mix is well-known and has been a part ofthe macroeconomics literature for a nummber of years, hut seldom has it generated controversy as it has now. Despite its recognition, however, little is known about the exact terms of the mnix or what indicators of monetary and fiscal policy are most appropriate to umse in defining it. For example, neither Tobin, the Brookings econoniists, nor the Congressional Budget Office state by how much fiscal policy should be tightened and to what extent monetary policy should be eased.
The gravity of the current economic situation requires that the notion of policy mix" ie given a more precise interpretation. Is cmmrrent policy what it seems?
How does one measure the ease and tightness of monetary and fiscal policies? What measures of economic performance are relevant to the mix argument-interest rates, GNP, the ratio of investment to CNP? What horizon is pertinent-short-run, longrun, a specific number ofyears? Can policies really be traded off to achieve a specific economic objective?
These are the types of questions that are given short shrift when the mix of policies is discussed. The purpose of this article is to provide some specificity to the policy mix question. As a point of departure, some indicators of monetary' and fiscal policy are examined, amud a historical classification of policy mix is developed. A conventional macroeconomic treatment of polic~'mix is then presented, providing the basis for developmnent of testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested, and somne policy implicatiomus are derived.
DEFIPS INC EASE AND TIGHTNESS
OF i. 2 OLICY Many sumnnsary measures of nionetary and fiscal policy have been developed over the years. The mnaimi reason fUr seeking such a measure is to provide a quick interpretation of current policy stamuce. The criteria for selection are that the nieasure primnarily reflect movements in the instruments of policy' andl that it not he influenced greatly by the pace of economic activity.
4 In other words, the indicator should reflect the thrust of the policy on the economy rather than the reverse.
)%:Icasurcmcnt oj 1~U o~.atiu 'u ,~i.trans Measuring the stance of monetary policy revives many controversial issues, one of the oldest of which centers on the choice between interest rates and monetary aggregates Although the level of interest rates is often alluded to as an indicator of monetary policy, most analysts have fhund it to he unreliable as a policy measure, since a great mnany forces influmenee interest rates besides mnonetary actions. The monetary ag,gregates, on the other hand, tend to reflect more accurately changes in the policy imustrnments-open market operations, reserve requiremnents and the discount rate-without being influenced undumly by outside forces.' Chief among the candidates for a monetary policy indicator are the money stock (Ml) and the monetary base. The mnonetary base has appeal because it reflects more accurately changes in the instrumnents of policy than does Ml. The Ml measure, however, tends to be more closely related to CNP. Labeling momuetary' policy as easy' or tight is, of course, quite arbitrary. The procedure followed here is to examimue the historical record of Ml and develop a classification of relatively easy and relatively tight policy on the basis of this record. To make this classification mneaningfml, one mimst accoumut fUr changes in the trend ofmonetary growth, particularly ifone intends to ficus on the imnpact of monetary' policy' on real variables. Consumers and investors come to expect certaimu groxvth rates of the mnonetarv aggregates, basing such expectations on past experience. It is the deviation of the monetary aggregate around this expected growth rate that a,ffeets real economic activity. Table 1 summarizes monetary policy since 1956. The first column shows the four-quarter rate ofchange of Nil minus its trend (20-quarter rate of change) fUr the period ending in the fourth quarter of each year (except for 1982).' The second column, which classifies monetary policy as easy, tight or neutral, follows from a three-part division of the observations in the first column. The mean plus or minus ½ standard deviation serve as points of demarcation. The classification is relative and also approximate. Rigidly adhering to the four-quarter rate of change can mnask changes in policy that occur within the year. A more exhaustive study would not be tied to periods of fixed length. Nonetheless, the classification seems to accord with commnon interpretation of economic experience; for example, all of the observations labeled as "tight" occurred near recession periods. 1Jf1/ u; ~'1cn•an, s The measurement of fiscal actions, also has beemu researched extensively over the years.
5 The chief conclusion from this research is that recorded surpluses or deficits do not provide an accurate measure of fiscal actions. The reason is that a considerable amotmnt ofthe movement of receipts and expenditures reflects an automatic response to the pace of economic activity rather than policy actions, Consequently, only fiscal measures on a high-emuployment basis are considered. 9 These high-employment budget measures The latte two measures sx re' tested for the presen hange )f receipts minu. the r te of change' f xpendi of trend but nom e was appa ent.
The right-hand portion of table 1 summarizes these other extreme of tight monetary policy and easy fiscal three fiscal measures over the 1956-to-1982 period, policy occurred in 1957, 1975 and 1982~these were The rate of change of high-employment expenditures recession years, although all of 1975 is not classified is included because previous studies have used it as a so according to the National Bureau of Economic summnary' fiscal measure even though it does not re-Research. fleet changes in tax policy. mo The other two highemnploymnent measures-the rate of change of receipts minus the rate of change of expenditures and the change in the surplus/deficit scaled by' potential CNP-reflect changes in both tax polic~'and expenditure policy'. In general, these latter two measnres yield the same classification of easy, tight and neutral.
The current situation (note that 1982 refers to the fbur quarters ending in second quarter 1982) clearly falls into the classification of tight monetary policy' and easy' fiscal policy'. According to the detrencled measure of monetary' policy as shown in table 1, 1981 and 1982 are the tightest years fUr monetary' policy fUr the 1956-82 period. The measures of fiscal policy', however, do not indicate unusual ease. The expenditure measure does not indicate ease at all, and the other two, although suggesting ease, do not indicate that the dcgree of ease is unusual. There have been six or seven of the last 27 years (depending on which measure is used) when fiscal policv~has been easier than in 1982.
The current concern about the mnix of policies, however, is not focused entirely on the recent past (note, in particular, the quotations by Brookings and the Congressional Budget Office above). There is concern about the near future. In other words, given current trends, analysts seem to he mnost concerned abommt developing trends in the mnix. Consequently, a fUll assessment of policy' mix requires an extrapolation of trends to determine if the mix of policies appears to he worsening, that is, that monetary policy' is tightening further or at least remaining tight, and that expenditure and tax policies are leading to a further easing of fiscal policy. The measures of monetary and fiscal policy can he combined to give a classification of each year in terms of the mix of those policies. Table 2 provides this summary' on the basis of detrencled Ml and the highemployment surplus/deficit measure of fiscal action. The years shown in the corners of this mnatrix are mnost revealing. Periods when both policies were tight clearly' were associated with recessions; those when both were easy' were associated with economic expansion. The periods ofcontrasting policies, though few in numnher, are interesting nonetheless. Easy' nmonetary policy and tight fiscal policy occtmrred only' in 1968 and 1978, both expansion years before business cycle peaks. Tbe '°SeeLcomiall C. Amidersen and Jerry L. Jordan, "Mommetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of'Fheir Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization," this Renew (Novcmbc'r 1968), pp. 11-24.
Figure 1
Determination ot Real Income, Interest Rate and Investment-Saving Ratio
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IS curve depicts equilibrium in goods and services market. LM curve depicts equilibrium in money market.
Soving rotio (t/X, S/X)
Investment and saving curves are drawn for gven level of real income (X).
The qmmestion of polic~'mix is broad, encompassing a large body' of macroeconomic theory' and empirical support for the theom' . Since a broad review of the theory is thus pi-ohihitive,a typical examnple from macroeconomic textbooks is summarized to represent the policy'-mix literattmre. mm
The notion of policy' mix usually' is explained by' using the well-known Hicksian IS-LM framework. According to this framnework, the level of economic activity' (real income) and the level of interest rates are aggregate markets: the market for goods and services amid the market for money'. m2 Fiscal policy, that is, changes in federal expendittmres and tax rates, influence the economliv throtmgh the market for goods and services, while monetary' policy' sx'orks through the money market.
The IS-LM model is summarized in figure 1. The IS curve is the locus of combinations of interest rate and real economic activity' consistent with equilibrium in the goods and services market. The curve is downward-sloping because lower interest rates induce higher levels of investment, which increase real income through the mnultiplier. Including the federal government in the analysis broadens the eqmmilibrium condi- income, the curves are drawn here only with reference to the equilibrium level of income.
The LM curve, as shown in figure 1, is the locus of combinations of interest rate and real economic activfly consistent with equilibrium in the money market. Money is definedas currency plus checkable deposits. The curve is upward-sloping because the demand lbr real balances is assumed to be negatively related to interest rates and positively related to real income. Consequently, in order 1kw the demand 1kw real balances to be equal to a fixed supply, an increased demand for money balances as real income increases must be offset by reduced demand for money balances via higher interest rates.
Real income and interest rates are determined simultaneously by the intersection of the IS and LM curves. Only this combination ofinterest rate and real income is consistent with equilibrium in both the goods and services and money markets. The way that this equilibrium combination changes in response to monetary and fiscal actions is of interest here.
Fiscal actions affect equilibrium by shifting the IS curve, while monetary actions shift the LM curve. Consequently, a given level of real income can be achieved with different combinations, or mixes, of monetary and fiscal actions. For example, in figure 2, the combination of IS 1 and LM 1 represents "easy" fiscal policy and "tight" monetary policy, and a given level of real income is achieved with a higher interest rate than at the original equilibrium. Similarly, the intersection ofIS 2 and LM 2 reflects "fight fiscal policy and "easy" monetary policy. "High" interest rates imply a lower rate of private investment (see righthand panel) and thus signify slower economic growth over the long tenn than a set of policies that yields "low" interest rates.
Within the context of the current economic situation, the implication seems to be that the U.S. economy is operating at a point corresponding to the intersection of IS 1 and LM 1 . This interpretation, however, is not obvious. Bather, Tobin and Brcokings economists seem to draw the conclusion that the economic recovery cannot be started or sustained unless interest rates are reduced by changingthe mix of policies. This interpretation suggests that they view the IS-LM framework in dynamic rather than in static terms. In other words, the level of real income and interest rates are being moved over time by a combination of policies in such a way that interest rates are rising'-or at least being sustained at high levels.
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Figure 3
Inhlafionary Expectations and the~S-1M Framework -a Expected. Inflation and the IS-Li. :1 iWod.eI
The version of the IS-LM model discussed above is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. One of the most important simplifications is that inflation and expectations of inflation can he ignored. It wouki seem that any discussion of current economic developments should be based on a framework that allows for the effect of expected inflation.
The effect of introducmg expectations into the IS-LM model is shown in figure 3 . The interest rate axis now represents both nominal and real interest rates.
represents equilibrium in the goods~~£1I~(l services market with expected inflation equal to zero (implying nominal and real interest r~ites~ire the same). The effect of introducing expected inflation of some positive amount is to shift the IS curve upward and to the right with respect to nommal rates, but leave it unchanged in terms of real rates. The reason fhr this is that consumption and investment decisions are assumed to be based on real rather than nominal rates of interest. This means that~s1 is raised above IS 0 by the amount of expected inflation.
The effect on the LXI curve of introducing expected inflation is somewhat more complicated. If, for exam-pIe, the demand for real balances depends on the difference between rates of return on money and all other assets, then expected inflation will afThct all of these rates of return equall~',including the return on real balances, and the LXI curve will not he affected when drawn in terms of the nominal interest rate. If the assumption of equal efli~ctsof expected inflation on all asset returns is relaxed, however, the results will differ. An increase in expected inflation generally can he expected to increase the nominal return on capital relative to bonds and money. W~ealth-bolders will attempt to rearrange their portfhlios to hold more capital and less money and bonds. Prices of capital will rise as those on bonds fall; that is, interest rates will rise. This means the LM curve will shift upward when drawn with reference to the nominal rate of interest. Because all wealth is not affhcted by a change in expectations, however, the upward shift ofthe LM curve will be less than the change in expected inflation.
The effect on policy mix of introducing expectations into the IS-LM model depends on the response of expectations to any change in policy. If expectations do not change in response to a shift in policy, the mix can be changed as in the basic model-A given level of income can be achieved with different combinations of policies and different interest rates. On the other band, if expectations are responsive to either monetary or fiscal actions. a larger number of possibilities is introduced, depending on the nature of the expectations response. In general, the faster expectations react to actual changes in monetary or fiscal policy, the less the efl'ect of policy changes on the real variables, that is, real income, real interest rates and the investment ratio.
T.ESTI.NG Ti••IE \fL HYPOTHE 8.15
The IS-LM framework providc~sa rationale for assigning the mix of policy an important role in planning the course of economic activity. Though there are many problems involved in moving from the classroom blackboard to economic reality, tbe general framework can still serve as a guide in formulating a test of the mix hypothesis -
Testing Pracei:hsre
The question of policy mix focuses on the aggregative eflects of monetary and fiscal actions and thus lends itself to a reduced-form approach to hypothesis testing. 13 The details of the transmission mechanism NOTE All variables are expressed in percent terms ft d) n a polici action to economic -ictis its are of second dc t i mined hi san ii g the lag bs nultiples of four audi ai interest a. is the process bs ss hicli inflationars cb osing from these caressions di i he h' sis of maxpectations a e formed Rither the chief cone rn is imum djustecl R'. The -klmd ii lag technique ss a used I ether cc tim s dues of key x,onoinic ariables can sĩth the coefficients constrais ed to he on a thirdhe hR s eel ith difl ic nt cot ibinatmom s of monetars degree p0
1 ' nc miual si itb i a ii on tr i t. These c> tiand fiscal actions. mates xi re sted igainst the unre trictc dl Ic ast-
squares c stisnates to ens re t at the smoothness 'I h x a tables used in the anals sis and s immarized --. . ass unption could not lie ej ct ci Iii the data. in table 3 are rc st set dl to those nnphc it in the IS-LM frames cirk. Tb el~pendent sat iahles ar • sc al ( \ P ea and i omutal inte est rates and the atio if fi ed is estinc nt t G\ P. rhese s in bles ii e e regs essed on ci rent a id Ia r 'clx als es oftbc i 0 iet~s md fiscal ti-chIc~The s egi c ions md Is ma inter t rite dIes onstr-ited s list' i tial autocor~latio i i tI residu-ils so t iese equat on is idjustecl Ising the Coch -fl -Os cutt roc -dlure. Al dither eq tations is crc est mated is ith or~li i. s least sq iares. Lag k nc t i ssas The mix effect is defined as the percentage change in Mi that would lie reqcnred to offset a tighter fiscal policy and keel) the dependent varialile constant. A tighter fiscal policy is defined as a decrease in federal spending that would increase the change in the highemployment lmudget imy 65 billion for 1.960 and 1 1961.
An appendix provides the specifics of how this tighter fiscal policy is defined. 
Nominal interest rates and policy rnix-Many
in monetary policy shifts the IS curve to the left, leadanalysts consider the level of nominal interest rates to ing to a fall in interest rates. To keep interest rates he the primary cause for the current economic malaise.
unchanged, monetary policy would have to lie tight-Yet the IS-LM model depicts the interest rate as a ened, shifting the LM curye to the left. Consequently, dependent variable. So, the first question investigated the implication of the simple IS-LM model is that the here is whether the nominal interest rate is systemnati-"mix effect" would he negative. eally related to monetary-fiscal actions. The rela-.
---.
The results in In general, fiscal policy has no effect on the Aaa bond accompanied by a tighter monetary policy in order to rate; thus, there is no mix efihct. The effect of monetary keep interest rates unchanged. Resnemnher that the expansion, on the other hand, builds up over time and model of figure 2 ignores the influence of price cx-appears to lie permanent. These results suggest that it pectations. A tightening of fiscal policy with no change is necessary to augmnent the IS-LM snoclel with price Real interest rates and policy mix-Recent concern the Aaa bond rate minus past inflation. To the extent about the level of interest rates -also has been couched that the equation has explanatory power, it comes from in terms (if the real rate.'
5 Many consider the current the monetary variable. Even that effect runs counter to high level of real rates an obstacle to economic recov-the conventional wisdom, as might he implied by an cry. Since real rates are not observable, however, expectations-augmented IS-LM model. More expanproxies have to be developed. Although much work sionary monetary policy is associated with increases in has been done, the simple proxy of a nominal rate the real rate. Such an effect should probably not be minus the recent rate of inflation is still most common-taken too seriously, however, because of the problems ly used. For this analysis, the real rate is proxiecl by the inherent in measuring the real rate. Aaa bond rate minus the rate of change of the CNP Output growth and policy mix-Another interpretadeflator over the four previous years.
tion of the mix problem is that output growth is being
The results are summarized in table 5, fbllowing the retarded by the particular combination of policies in same format as before. The explanatory power of each effect. The next set of regressions examines the rate of equation is very low, although the monetary effect is output growth as a function of the monetary and fiscal significant in each case. The fiscal effect is not signifi-variables. These results are summarized in What is apparent from these regressions is the impor- 
t Sums are cumulative for number of lags md cated Absolute valu oft-statistic in parentheses indicates sum is significant at 5 percent level 2 Mix effect is the change in Ml (in percentage points) required to offset a tightening offiscal policy in the form of an increase in A(S 0 )H of $5 billion To offset means to keep the dependent vanable unchanged See appendix for details "Undef'~means the mix effect is undefined; neither the monetary or fiscal effect a significantly different from zero (5 percent level).
tance of the length of horizon. Money growth stimu-lime striking feature of these regressions is that the lates output growth in the short run, hut this stimulus explanatory power of these equations is quite high, fades after a year. Consequently, any potential mix with about 55 percent of the niovement in the investeffect is applicable only in the short rmin, hut none is ment ratio explained by the monetary and fiscal vanfound because the fiscal effect on output is not signifi-ables. Also, no correction for serial correlation is necescantly different fromn zero. sary. l'he effect of monetary policy on the investment ratio is first positive, then negative (shown liv a decline rIse conventional wmsdom indicates that a tightening cent level after 16 quarters for each of the three fiscal cantly different from zero, there is no mix effect. And, .~~for the long term, the mnix effect is undefined because \-ariaoies. neither the effects of monetary or fiscal actiomms are significantly different from zero.
. -
The mix effect for the investment ratio, according to Investment ratio and policy mix-A final variable of conventional wisdom, should he negative. A tighteninterest to those concerned with the current mix of ing of fiscal policy should he accompanied by a tightenpolicies is the investmnent ratio. Easy fiscal policy is ing of monetary policy in order to keep the investment thought to discourage private investment because the ratio constant. That is, a tightening of fiscal policy is federal government preenmpts the use ofloanable funds supposed to encourage investmnemmt; if that is to he (see figure 2). To investigate this effect, the change in offset. monetary policy also should he tightened. For the ratio of fixed investment to GNP is run against the all cases in table 7, the conventional wisdom is upheld. monetary and fiscal variables. nent effect on the investnu mit ratio, while fiscal actions higher, not lower. The implication for real rates is not do (this result is shown a~).
clear; even though real rates si-c e positively related to money growth, the regressions were miot significant. To the extent that interest rat s can he explained, money growth, not fiscal actions, prom ides the explanation. An These regression results carr~certaui nnplications easing of fiscal policy alone does not guarantee a fall in for economic policm that a e at maniance with the con-interest rates. The eft~ctof fiscal actions on interest ventional wisdom on polic\ mix. The g mu n-il policy rates was not found to he significant. implications of the statistical results require further discussion. To give some indication ofthe magnitude of The idea (ifa solid recovery is that real output growth effect, some different polic\ mixes are simnulati d for could be stimulated liv shifting the mix toward tighter the period from 1981 to 1985.
fiscal policy amid easier monetary policy. The regression results indicate that this desired effect could lie Gem-ru! Po/Icq impheutiour achieved, but only temporarily. Easier monetary policy stimulates output gromvth initially, but this effect These regression ii stilts can he pulled togeth r into dissip ites after a veam Furthermore the regression a general conclusion. Consider Toliin 5 reconimenda-results indicate that fiscal effects on outliut growth are tion, cited at the heginning of this paper: not significant, either in the short or long rim.
To achieve a solid recover'-, such as the administration , projects, and to aclneve it~vithoutastronomical interest Tohin s recommendation has some validity in its rates and serious crowding out, we need an easier assertion that the mix should lie changed to avoid monetary policy combined with a tighter fiscal policy-serious crowding out. ' results, tighter fiscal policy would indeed encourage a fiscal policy that yields a balanced high-employmnemit rise in the investment ratio, limit interest rates would he budget by 198.5. The easy policy conforms roughlvwith mninimally affected. This shift to tighter fiscal policy, the prospective course of fiscal action as it appeared to however, need not be accompanied hy easier monetary he developing in early 1982. The tight policy is consispolicy. There isa positive effect of momietary actions on tent with a recouimendation liv the Brookings Instituthe investment ratio, but it appears to he temporary. tion in their annual report omi the federal liudget. 15, whereas the fiscal effect appears to he permanent.
Two monetary policies were simulated: one is a --steady expansion of Ml at a 4.5 liercent rate, the other e~mwuUwuof Aiternuiire Pout-u Mixes is expansion at a 6.5 percent rate. The first pohc~is labeled "tight" and~~'onldhe within the 1982 target To provide some specific indication of the inagni-range announced by the Federal Reserve. The 6.5 tudes imivolved iii the policy miiix controversy, the re-percent scenario for money is called "easy," and would gression results were used to simulate three different be above the upper end of the 1982 target range. nines of iioltc~foi the 1982-85 pcrmod Point stun ites of the coefficients were used even if they were not Table 8 gives the results of these simulations. The significantly difiCrent from zero, iT ' result of tightening fiscal policy and easing monetary policy (compare the first and third columns) is to push Tmvo fiscal scenarios were chosen; one is based on up nominal interest rates. The growth of output is fiscal actions that lead to a 8150 billion deficit in the high-emplovmnent budget liv 1985, the other a tiahter actually worsened by the change in the mix, the reason being that inflation accelerates with easier monetary policy. The investment ratio, however, is increased by changing the mix of policy. As the middle column of table 8 shows, there is little to be gained by expanding money more rapidly when fiscal policy is tightened.
Although easing monetary policy appears desirable because of its beneficial effects on fixed investment, recall that the long-run effects ofmoney growth on the investment ratio were not statistically different from zero.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The notion of policy mix has been presented in textbooks and discussed by eminent analysts almost as if it were a self-evident truth. Arecommended change in policy mix seems to be based on the well-known IS-LM model. When scrutinized more closely, the question ofthe appropriate mix ofmonetary-fiscal policies is not as clear-cut as the simple IS-LM model implies. The lagged effects of policy actions must be taken into account, as well as the empirical realities of certain economic relationships. This paper examined thur dependent variables that seem relevant in any discussion of policy mix-nominal interest rates, real interest rates, the rate ofoutput growth, and the investment ratio. The conclusions are as follows:
(1) Movements ofnominal interest rates and, to alesser extent, real rates are dominated by monetary actions. The effect offiscalactions on interestrates is not statistically significant.
(2) There is a short-run effect of monetary actions on output growth, but it is only temporary. Over the long run, movements In output growth are unaffected by either monetary or fiscal actions.
(3) The investment ratio is influenced temporarily by monetary actions, but the effect appears to be pennanent for fiscal actions.
These conclusions imply that the IS-LM framework must be carefully interpreted when used as a guide for policy analysis, and that current recommendationsfbr a change in the mix are only partly valid. Fiscal policy should indeed be lightened in order to stimulate an increase in the investment ratio, iflong-term economic growth and/or housing investment is a national goal.
There is little evidence, however, to support the notion that interest rates would be affected greatly. 
